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SQUEEZING OUT MINORITY CLOSE
CORPORATION SHAREHOLDERS
IN NORTH DAKOTA
I. INTRODUCTION

In a large corporation where the stock is publicly held,
there is no question that the majority shareholders should
control the corporation. If the safeguards provided for the
majority shareholders will fall back on their corporate adadequate, he has the remedy of simply selling his stock and
getting out.
In a close corporation,, the participants probably intended at first to operate as a partnership, and later decided to
incorporate only so they could have limited liability and
certain tax and other advantages. Even after incorporating
they often expect, as among themselves, to carry on as a
partnership with all participants having a say in the management. They often disregard corporate formalities such as
board of director meetings. Since the participants are in
constant contact with each other in the day to day operation
of the corporation there arise many disputes and often the
majority shareholders will fall back on their corporate advantage of majority rule. The minority "partners" may
then be out in the cold without a voice in the management of
the company, perhaps without any dividends on their stock
interest together with termination of their employment. The
shareholder in this situation cannot withdraw his investment
because there is no market for his stock.
This procedure and
"squeeze-out" which may
rate control vested in the
or the board of directors

result is commonly termed a
be defined as the use of the corpostatutory majority of shareholders
to eliminate minority shareholders

1.
I O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE 13
(1958) (hereinafter cited as O'NEAL) states that close corporations are
usually characterized by: (1) substantial identity of ownership and management; (2) ownership by a small number of shareholders: (3) no venersI market for the stock: and (4) some limitation upon admission of
shareholders.
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from the enterprise, to reduce to relative insignificance their
voting power or claims on corporate assets, or otherwise to
2
deprive them of corporate income or advantages.
The following discussion will point out some of the techniques used to squeeze out minority shareholders and some
of the protective devices available through proper drafting.
II.

A.
ment.

METHODS USED IN SQUEEZE-OUTS

Withholding Dividends and Termination of Employ-

One of the most commonly used squeeze-out methods is
the withholding of dividends. A minority shareholder, in
financial trouble or counting on dividends as his sole means
of support, will in most cases be forced to sell his interest to
the majority shareholders at a price below the fair value of
the interest. The majority shareholders escape the hardships
of no dividends by holding corporate offices and thereby
receiving large salaries.
It is very difficult for a minority shareholder to compel
the directors to declare dividends, the main difficulty being
the overcoming of the business judgment rule which gives
the directors wide discretion in the management of the corpo3
ration.
Protection could be given the minority shareholders
through an agreement among the participants or a charter
or by-law provision which would make the declaration of
dividends mandatory in certain specified situations (perhaps
when net income is a certain amount or when retained earnings reach a certain level).' The use of this provision could,
however, prove damaging to the corporation since provisions
which take away the discretion of the directors in paying
dividends might endanger the company's working capital
2.
3.

II O'NEAL 105.
See generally on minority shareholders' power to compel dividends.

Scholder, Dividends and the Minority Stockholder in a Closely-Held Corporation, 14 N.Y.U. Intra. L. Rev. 140 (1959); Note, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 299
(1950); Note, 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 723 (1956).
4. Shareholder agreements (if all the shareholders are parties) and
charter and by-law provisions providing for mandatory dividends have
been sustained in the following cases: Arizona Western Ins. Co. v. L. L.
Constantin & Co.. 247 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1957) (Charter provisions): Lydia
E. Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove, 303 Mass. 1, 20 N.E.2d 482 (1939) (bylaws); Marlino v. West Coast Macaroni Mfg. Co., 90 Cal. App. 2d 106. 202
P.2d 748 (1949) (shareholder agreement).
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position or may not allow the corporation to meet future
expansion needs through the use of retained earnings.
Another squeeze-out technique commonly used in conjunction with the withholding of dividends is the termination
of employment of the minority shareholder. A person acquiring a substantial minority interest in a close corporation
usually plans to serve as a responsible employee on a full
time basis. However, in North Dakota directors can remove
an officer or employee of the company whenever in their
judgment the best interests of the corporation will be served. 5
This action in conjunction with the withholding of dividends
would make his investment in the corporation virtually worthless, and under these conditions it would be unlikely that he
could find a buyer for his interest at a fair price.
A minority shareholder can protect himself against termination of employment by means of a long term employment
contract between the shareholder and the corporation, being
sure to provide that his salary will be increased in proportion
to other designated officers. The validity of such a contract
is uncertain in some jurisdictions6 , however, the modern
trend is to recognize such a contract. 7 Even when recognized
the courts would not specifically enforce an employment
contracts and damages would not be an adequate remedy. 9
As an added protection the employee could use in addition
a shareholders' agreement, because this agreement is specifically enforceable in many jurisdictions, especially when all
shareholders are parties to the agreement. 10 Also the possi5.
N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19-50 (1961).
6.
General Paint Corp. v. Kramer, 57-F.2d 698 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
287 U.S. 605 (1932); Borland v. John F. Sass Printing Co., 95 Colo. 53, 32
P.2d 827 (1934): Carney v. New York Life Ins. Co., 162 N.Y. 453, 57 N.E.
78 (1900); Annots., 135 A.L.R. 646 (1941), 35 A.L.R. 1432 (1925).
7.
E.g., Hansen v. Columbia Breweries, Inc., 12 Wash. 2d 554, 122 P.2d
489 (1942): Littell v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 120 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir.
1941). For an excellent discussion of employment contracts see I O'NEAL
333-369.
8.
Schultz v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., 128 F.2d 889 (8th
Cir. 1942); Lyon v. Goss, 19 Cal. 2d 659, 123 P.2d 11 (1942). See WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1423 A (rev. ed. 1937). See also RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 379 (1932).
9. N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19-50 (1961) provides that an officer can be
removed by the board, but such removal shall be without prejudice to
the contract rights of the person removed. This indicates that the only
remedy for breach of an employment contract in
North Dakota would
be an action for damages. See Model Bus. Corp. Act. Annot. § 45, 4.
10. Katcher v. Ohsman, 26 N.J. Super 28, 97 A.2d 180 (1953); Clark v.
Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1939); See also Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 799.
802 (1956) and I O'NEAL 301; See infra section II1(A).
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bility of personal liability would keep a majority shareholder
from causing a breach of the employment contract.
B. Merger Or Issuance Of,New Stock
In North Dakota two or more corporations can combine
into a single corporation by following a prescribed procedure,
even though less than all shareholders approve."
In exchange for their original shares the minority shareholder may
be given stock of the surviving corporation with different
rights and preferences' 1 and commonly with a large dilution
of the minority interest. North Dakota provides for the rights
of dissenting shareholders in such actions by giving an option
3
to demand the fair value of their stock.1
Another method commonly used to dilute the minority
interest is by issuing new stock. North Dakota gives all
shareholders a pre-emptive right to purchase their pro rata
share of the new stock. 4 If the pre-emptive right is not
given he can sue the corporation for damages, 15 enjoin the
stock issue 6 or obtain an order permitting him to subscribe.
It should be pointed out that the pre-emptive right is subject
to being withheld in the articles of incorporation" on unissued, treasury, or additional shares and this appears to
be commonly done.' 9
Even when the pre-emptive right protection is present,
the new stock issue could be timed by the majority to come
when the minority was in financial trouble and would be unable to purchase their pro rata share of the new issue. As a
practical matter, if the majority were acting in an oppressive
manner the minority shareholders would be forced to buy
their protection by investing more money in this bad situation,
or as an alternative being virtually eliminated from the corpo11.
N.D. Cent. Code §§ 10-20-01 and 10-20-03 (1961).
12. Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286. 242 P.2d 1025 (1952) is an
excellent illustration of this squeeze-out method.
13.
N.D. Cent. Code § 10-20-08 (1961).
14.
N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19-24 (1961).
15.
Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 285, 78 N.E. 1090 (1906).
16.
Electric Co. of America v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 200 Pa.
516, 50 Atl. 164 (1901).
17.
Hammond v. Edison Illuminating Co., 131 Mich. 79, 90 N.W. 1040
(1902).
18.
N.D. Cent. Code §§ 10-19-24. 10-19-53(8) and 10-19-58(16) (1961).
19.
See DODD AND BAKER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS, 928"(2d ed. 1951); Rohrlich, Suit in Equity by Minority Stockholderm sow a Means of Corporate Control, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 692, 702 (1933).
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ration through stock dilution.2 0 There is an important judicially created exception that the pre-emptive right does not
21
apply to shares issued in exchange for property.
Another method to dilute the minority interest would be
to remove the minority shareholders as officers and then
issue shares to the remaining officers or employees. The
pre-emptive right does not apply to this stock issue if twothirds of all shares entitled to vote approve.-C. Alteration Of Voting Rights
North Dakota makes cumulative voting mandatory,-' and
2 -4
also permits classification of directors for staggered terms.
Cumulative voting means that each voting shareholder is
entitled to votes equal to the number of his shares multiplied
by the number of directors to be elected and he may then
cast all these votes for a single director or distribute them
among more than one candidate. Under ordinary conditions
this requirement would insure the minority of representation
on the board of directors. However, by staggering the terms
of the directors the majority can reduce the number of directors to be elected each year and thus render cumulative voting
ineffective. This classification system has been approved by
most courts, stating that the constitutional provision guarantees only that cumulative voting will be available, not that it
2 5
will be effective..
D. Other Squeeze-out Techniques
The above discussion mentions only a few of the many
squeeze-out methods. Other techniques used by majority
shareholders in accomplishing a squeeze-out are the following:
The majority may drain off the corporation earnings by
paying high rent for property leased from majority shareholders or by paying high salaries and bonuses to the majority
shareholder-officers and perhaps their relatives; they may
20. See Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 6. 99 A.2d 236
(1953).
21. Thorn v. Baltimore Trust Co., 158 Md. 352, 148 Atl. 234 (1930), 39 Yale
L.J. 905 (1930).
22. N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19-24 (1961).
23. N.D. Const. Art. VII § 135 and N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19-33 (1961).
24. N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19-38 (1961).
25. E.g., Janney v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 387 Pa. 282, 128 A.2d 76l
(1956). But see Wolfson v. Avery, 6 111. 2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955).
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cause the corporation to sell its assets at an inadequate price
to the majority shareholders or to companies in which the
majority are interested;26 they may organize a new company
in which the minority will have no interest, transfer the
corporation's assets or business to it, and then dissolve the
old corporation; or they may transfer the business to a company incorporated in a state where climate is favorable to a
2
squeeze-out. 1
III.

MINORITY PROTECTION ARRANGEMENTS

Participants in a close corporation can approximate the
control advantages of a partnership through the use of certain
minority protection arrangements.
A. Voting Agreements And Trusts
One method would be by use of the shareholders' pooling
agreement. This agreement is one in which the parties vote
their stock in the election of directors and in other matters
as mutually agreed upon by them. Such agreements have
generally not met with favor in the courts because they violate statutes requiring that the board of directors manage the
29
corporation. 2s An 1895 North Dakota case, Gage v. Fisher,
held that a stockholders' contract by which another controlled
the way in which the stockholder voted his stock was illegal
and void as violative of public policy. The opinion stated
that stockholders' agreements to vote stock together are not
illegal, in the sense that the law regards a vote cast pursuant
thereto as void or voidable, yet it might be contrary to public
policy for a court of equity to decree specific performance
of such a contract, especially where the sole object of the
person seeking to enforce the contract was to secure control
The Gage case seems to indicate a
of the corporation.2
N.D. Cent. Code § 10-20-11 (1961) provides that a dissenting share26.
holder can demand the fair value of his shares where substantially all of
the property and assets are being sold, when not in the usual and regular
course of its business or in connection with the dissolution and liquidation of the corporation.
These methods and many more are discussed in O'NEAL AND DER27.
WIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES (1961).
28.
N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19-36 (1961).
5 N.D. 297, 65 N.W. 809 (1895).
29.
The court stated in Gage v. Fisher, nupra note 29, at 811, "But it is
30.
also true that many of these schemes to obtain the control of a corporation are conceived and carried on in a spirit inimical to the interests of
the minority stockholders, and not infrequently for the purpose of so

236
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general dislike of voting agreements and a fear that the courts
might not be able to separate agreements with a proper purpose from those with improper objectives and thus might
3
unwittingly lend their aid to dishonest litigants. '
32
A later North Dakota case held that a shareholder in
an unincorporated association could not validly agree to use
his voting powers so as to benefit another party at the expense
of the association of which he was a member.
These decisions shed uncertainty on shareholder agreements in North Dakota, certainly with respect to controlling
voting of stock, although the prevailing view in most states
is to uphold such agreements if formed for a proper purpose. 3
To insure that voting agreements will be carried out without bringing an action for specific performance, the shareholders could relinquish their power to vote their own shares
and confer that power in the form of an irrevocable proxy
upon one or more of their group or upon some person not a
party to the agreement. A proxy to be irrevocable must be
coupled with an interest.3 4 The "interest" which the proxy
holder must have to make the proxy irrevocable is either
(1) a charge, lien or some property right in the shares themselves, or (2) a security interest given to protect the proxy
33
holder for money advanced or obligations incurred.
To avoid the uncertainty of the pooling agreement, it
would seem wiser to allocate control through a voting trust
as provided for in North Dakota by statute.36 A voting trust
is achieved by a transfer of shares of stock to voting trustees
by a group of shareholders pursuant to a trust agreement
so as to vest legal title to the shares in the trustees. The
trustees then vote the shares according to conditions set forth
in the written trust agreement. The voting trust is legally
the most effective control device outside the corporate framework, yet its disadvantages may still make it undesireable.3 7
managing the affairs of the corporation as to force them to sell their
holdings at practically such a figure as the majority stockholders should
dictate."
31. I O'NEAL 301.
32.
Luedke v. Oleen, 72 N.D. 1, 4 N.W.2d 201 (1942).
33.
I O'NEAL 242.
34.
LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 321 (1959).
35.
I O'NEAL 319.
36.
N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19-35 (1961).
37.
See I O'NEAL 312. One of the main disadvantages in North Da-

kota is that the duration of the trust is limited to ten years and requires
that a copy of the trust

agreement be deposited with the corporation, thus
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B. High Voting Or Quorum Requirements
Probably the simplest and most desireable device for
providing partner-like control in a close corporation is by
requiring unanimity, or voting requirements so high as to
approach unanimity for action by stockholders and directors.
This in effect gives each minority "partner" a veto power
over actions by the corporation.
High voting requirements are sanctioned by statute in
North Dakota both as to action by directors 3s and stockholders.3 9 However, in view of the wording of the North Dakota
statute there is some doubt that a requirement of unanimity,
as distinguished from a high percentage requirement, is
40
valid.
Another method of achieving veto over corporate action,
whether at the director or the shareholder level, is through
the use of high quorum requirements for shareholder and
director meetings. 41 If high attendance is required to constitute a quorum, a shareholder or director by staying away
from a meeting could prevent corporate action from being
taken. To make this method effective there must be a requirement that notices of meetings state the business that is to be
transacted.
To insure that high vote or high quorum requirements
will not be amended by a two-thirds vote, similar high vote
requirements should be provided for in the articles of incorpo42
ration for any amendment.
C. Other Protection Devices
One method of assuring that all participants will have
representation on the board of directors is to set up two or
more classes of stock and provide that each class is to vote
for and elect a specified number of the directors, however,
this method will prevent any possibility of using sub-chapter
making the terms of the agreement available to all shareholders. Because the shares are transferred to the trustee the stockholder may give
up certain rights of a stockholder such as examination of the corporation
books.
38. N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19-41 (1961).
39.
N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19-34 (1961).
40.
I O'NEAL 209 and 215.
41. N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19-41 (1961).
42.
N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19-59 (1961).
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S, since a corporation desiring to be taxed as a partnership
43
can have only one class of stock.
Participants in a close corporation will likely wish protection against a possible transfer of stock to strangers with
whom they do not care to be associated.44 The most popular
and useful device is the first-option restriction which imposes
a requirement that before stock of a shareholder is transferred to an outsider an offer must first be made to sell the
stock to the corporation or to the other shareholders or
to both. Such a restriction may be a private agreement
among the shareholders or may appear in the articles of incorporation or the by-laws. In drafting this restriction it is
important to provide a method for fixing the transfer price.4 5
The most ideal protective safeguard of all is to give the
minority shareholders the option to sell their shares to the
corporation at any time for a determinable price. This would
give the minority shareholder a market for his stock so he
could withdraw his investment when the majority were acting
in an oppressive manner. The main difficulty here would
be to provide the corporation with a means of paying for the
stock. If the corporation could not pay for the stock the
minority shareholder could use the option to harass the
majority.
D. Dissolution And Arbitration
The close corporation is particularly susceptible to deadlock because of the minority control arrangements which may
give a minority interest greater voting power or even a veto
power. If minority control devices are used there must be
some provision for a deadlock situation where the shareholders or directors cannot agree and therefore management of
the corporation cannot continue. There are two major remedies; dissolution and arbitration.
In North Dakota the minority would always be able to
block a voluntary dissolution if certain control devices were
in effect. A voluntary dissolution by consent of shareholders
43.

Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1371 (a)(4).

44.
See generally, O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely
Held Corporations: Planning and Drafting. 65 Harv. L. Rev. 774 (1952);
Cataldo, Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporation, 37 Va. L.

Rev. 229 (1951).
45. See 11 ONEAL 37 for a discussion of price determination methods.
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requires consent of all of the shareholders. 46 Voluntary dissolution by act of the corporation would give some hope for
dissolution. 4 - This method, however, requires that the directors pass a resolution recommending the corporation be dissolved and directing a stockholder vote. The minority could
block this resolution if a high vote requirement were present
for director action. If the resolution is passed there must
then be an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the outstanding
shares of the corporation. The minority could block this if
they controlled over one-third of the outstanding shares.
North Dakota does include deadlock as a grounds for
compulsory dissolution at the instance of less than a majority
interest if the minority can convince the district court of its
necessity. 4 Another solution for the deadlock problem would
be to provide statutory authorization for the participants to
make their own arrangements for dissolution because of deadlock. Two other logical solutions have been suggested, although
neither has been tested in court. One is that the shareholders
should contract that if for a stated time their disagreement
causes corporate deadlock all shareholders will vote their
shares for dissolution. 49 The other solution would be that an
agreement be made among the shareholders to the effect that
if the company is unable to take action by reason of the dissent of a minority interest, an option to purchase shall become operative in favor of the majority shareholders at a
price prescribed in the contract.50
Arbitration would be a more desireable solution to the
deadlock situation because it would preserve the corporate
existence, would be less expensive, would be quicker and there
would be less publicity. The arbitration clause can be inserted in the pre-incorporation agreement and in the certificate,
with the exact procedure to be used, including a method for
selecting the arbitrators, clearly specified. 51 However, North
Dakota arbitration statutes seem to provide only for present
46.
N.D. Cent. Code § 10-21-02 (1'961).
47.
N.D. Cent. Code § 10-21-03 (1961).
48.
N.D. Cent. Code § 10-21-16 (1961).
49.
See Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate ExistenceProblems of
Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 778, 791 (1952).
50.
Cary, How Illinois Corporations May Enjoy Partnership Advantages:
Planning for the Closely Held Firm, 48 N.W. U. L. Rev. 427, 439 (1953).
51.
See I O'NEAL 214-221: Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitra-

tion Law, 37 Yale L.J. 595 (1928).
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disputes and not future disputes .52 This would not prove
effective in a close corporation because arbitration, to be
effective, must be agreed on in advance and must provide
for future disputes.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Undoubtedly the majority of North Dakota corporations
are close corporations. For this reason it seems peculiar
that North Dakota's corporation law would be drafted primarily for large publicly held corporations with no specific
reference to or statute for close corporations.
If proper drafting techniques are used, however, the
competent attorney can protect minority shareholders and
provide a partnership type relationship in North Dakota. The
greatest deficiency in the North Dakota law is that it does
not provide an adequate means of arbitration or a deadlock
solution short of dissolution for the close corporation.
North Carolina5 3 and New York 4 have led in the field
in close corporation law with special statutes for close corporations. There have been numerous law review articles advocating separate corporation statutes for the two types of
corporations and the arguments set forth are very persuasive. 55
A.

WILLIAM

LUCAS

52.
N.D. Cent. Code § 32-29-01 (1961). See Ham, The Close Corporation
Under Kentucky Law, 50 Ky. L.J. 125, 182 (1961)
where it states that
language in Kentucky's arbitration statute (which is similar to -North
Dakota's) has generally been interpreted as applying to the submission of
disputes which have already arisen. See also STURGIS, COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS 88 (1930).
53. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 55-1 to 55-175 (Supp. 1955).
54.
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law (McKinney 1961).. The principal section designed to liberalize the New York law in regard to close corporations is

section 620.
55.

Oppenheim, The Close

Corporation in

Californla-Necessity

of

Sep-

arate Treatment, 12 Hastings L.J. 227 (1961); A Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close Corporation, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 700 (1958);
Winer, Proposing a New York "Close Corporation Law", 28 Cornell L.Q.
313 (1943).

